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Abstract: The present paper is an attempt at examining the value configuration 
and the socio-demographical profiles of the local political elites in four countries 
of East-Central Europe: Romania, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland. The 
treatment is a comparative one, predominantly descriptive and exploratory, and 
employs, as a research method, the case-study, being a quite circumscribed 
endeavor. The cases focus on the members of the Municipal/Local Council in four 
towns similar in terms of demography and developmental strategies (i.e. small-
to-medium sized communities of around 35,000 inhabitants, with economies 
largely based on food industry and commercial activities): Tecuci (Galați county, 
Romania), Česk| Lípa (Liberec region, Czech Republic), Targovishte (Targovishte 
province, Bulgaria), and Oleśnica (Lower Silesia province, Poland). Hypothesizing 
that the local elites of the former Sovietized Erurope tend to differ in outlook, 
priorities, and value attainment, as compared to their Western counterparts, the 
paper considers the former’s attitudes and perspectives in regard to seven values: 
a series of values customarily connected with the concept of ‘democracy’ (i.e. 
citizen participation, political conflict, gradual change, economic equality), state 
intervention in economy, decentralization and increased local autonomy, 
cultural-geographical self-identification. The study uses, as well, five models of 
value attainment in what concerns the ‘ideal portrait’ of the local councilor 
(Putnam 1976): ethical, pragmatic, technocratic, political, and gender. According 
to the results of a study applying a standard written questionnaire among the 
local councilors of the three communities in the period December 2010-February 
2013, the paper distinguishes among three corresponding types of local elites: (1) 
‘predominantly elitistic,’ (2) ‘democratic elitist,’ and (3) ‘predominantly 
democratic,’ following two types of explanation accounting for the differences 
among the four cases: the legacy of the defunct regime and the degree of 
administrative decentralization.   
Keywords: local elites, East-Central Europe, values, decentralization, ancien 
régime, fivefold model 
I. Theoretical Assessments. On the Study of Local Political Elites and Their 
Values 
An analysis of the opinions and attitudes adopted by the local political elite is 
instrumental and paramount in the description of this group. In reference to the 
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views, perceptions, opinions and attitudes of the local political elite, and starting 
from the very simple, blunt and plausible assumption that the preferences, the 
orientations and the values of the leaders matter more than those of the masses, 
Robert Putnam (1976, 80) identifies four major orientations in the attitudes of 
this type of elite: cognitive orientations (predispositions based on which 
individuals interpret the existing reality; e.g. the attitudes regarding the social 
conflict); normative orientations (assessments regarding the way the society 
should be; e.g. the attitudes, ideologically motivated, towards the economical 
equality); interpersonal orientations (perceptions about the other segments of 
the political elite); stylistic orientations (“structural characteristics of the beliefs 
systems of the political elite” (Stoica 2003, 179)). Certain values embraced by the 
representatives of the local political elite can be explained by their social 
background: for instance, it is expected that those coming from lower class 
families are inclined to favor economic equality. Other values are acquired in the 
process of socialization (i.e. the type of education, the episodes of primary 
socialization, etc.). 
The literature dedicated to the study of local political elites is impressively 
reduced: the bulk of this literature derives from the broad study of political elites 
and consequently dates from the 1970s, once with the climax reached by the 
elitist empirical studies. In this respect, the most frequently quoted, the 
renowned oeuvre pertains to Robert Dahl who constructed its poliarchic model 
on the study of the municipality of New Haven. Among the most prominent 
studies on the slippery and feeble soil of local political elites, the mentionable 
titles are the pioneering works authored by Robert Staughton and Helen Merrell 
Lynd, Middletown (1929) and Middletown in Transition (1937), undertaken in 
Muncie (Indiana). Despite the anthropological overload of their volumes, it is 
important to bear in mind that the two American scholars were among the first 
to endeavor in such an inductively-driven urban inquiry, and the first to consider 
the impact of economic changes and development strategies on various 
segments of the town’s population, including the leading strata of the 
community, on these segments’ values and behaviors. Lynds’ work is equally 
significant for it paves the way for Dahl’s future observations, stressing on the 
relevance of power – even in the very confined, narrow space of a small town – 
and on the place of economic notables in Muncie, the ‘businessmen,’ on their 
conspicuous influence upon the political leadership of the town and on the entire 
activity and life of the urban community. From the prism of these conclusions, 
when discussing the “Middletown Studies,” Nelson Polsby (1963, 14) labels them 
as ‘Marxist’ (for they contend that property among the means of production 
provides for absolute power within a municipality) and the representatives of 
the ‘stratification theory’ in elitist studies, for they ultimately reach the 
conclusion that the local elite is the one that possess political power – usually 
springing from other form of power exerted at the local level, e.g. economical –, 
as an instrument for governing the community in accordance to its own 
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vernacular interests. Illustrative for the cases selected here (particularly for the 
Romanian case), although they stress on the ‘net separation’ between the 
economical institutions and the political ones, even at the local level, the Lynds 
do acknowledge the immanent interdependence between the two institutions 
and leadership, since  
those who dominate from an economic standpoint the community exert their 
control on the political problems, as well, only to avoid the too accentuated 
increase in taxation or a too strong involvement in their own affairs [by the 
political leadership]. Otherwise, they are totally disinterested in the political 
life. (Lynds 1937, 129)  
This assessment might appear yet too hazardous, taking into consideration the 
frequency and the intensity of interactions and network formation between the 
political and the economic elites; a series of tentative evaluations somehow 
antagonizing with Lynds’ conclusion are drawn from the present study, but, 
while the American study is focused on Muncie in the 1920s and 1930s, the 
present study is extremely contingent on four towns in East-Central Europe in 
2010-2013, making hence opposite views and results virtually irreconcilable for 
the simple fact that the two studies are circumscribed to particular instances, 
settings and time frames, with no pretence to exhaustive generalizations. As a 
matter of fact, the Lynds’ studies on ‘Middletown’ and their feeble conclusions in 
respect to the connections between economic and political elite at the local level 
(dominantly in urban areas) opened the way for similar, more mature and more 
meaningful empirical endeavors oriented towards the analysis of the said 
connections and of their impact on the developmental strategies and the general 
profile of the urban communities; notable in this sense is William Lloyd Warner’s 
study on ‘Yankee City’ (Newburyport, Massachusetts) (Warner & Lunt 1941; 
Warner & Lunt 1942; Warner & Strole 1945; Warner & Low 1947; Warner 1959; 
Warner 1963), the hypothetical urban center dominated by entrepreneurs, 
businessmen, freelancers and liberal professionals, who managed to forge a sort 
of ‘class consciousness’ and who virtually ousted any trace of autonomy from the 
political institutions. Surely, such a stance is too vehement and radical, since it 
implies the blunt reality that, at the local level, the economic elite is the one that 
ultimately governs in town. Notwithstanding his categorical positions, Warner 
and his work on ‘Yankee City’ are to be kept in mind when endeavoring in the 
thin and narrow field of local political leadership at least from two perspectives: 
firstly, his observations are heavily utilized and partly confirmed – albeit in a 
nuanced form – by the present research, which point to the pertinence and 
contemporaneity thereof; secondly, he employs a singular method, that of an 
‘index of evaluated participation’ (i.e. the construction of a scale comprising the 
expertise’s evaluation of the ‘prestige’ enjoyed by key-individuals within the 
community, and their placing on the social hierarchy), quite similar to Hunter’s 
method (presented below and further utilized, as well, in this study), which 
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stresses and manages somehow to operationalize the concept of elite ‘prestige.’2 
Soon after Warner’s ‘Yankee City’ studies had known scholarly recognition, Floyd 
Hunter advanced a resembling work, conducted in ‘Regional City’ (different 
researches in Atlanta, Georgia) among the members of the local upper class 
(Hunter, Schaffer & Sheps 1956). Hunter’s findings are strikingly similar to 
Warner’s: as in ‘Yankee City,’ in ‘Regional City,’ 
the businessmen are the leaders of the community […], as they actually are in 
any town. The wealth, the social prestige and the political machinery are 
functional to the wielding of power by these leaders. (Hunter 1953, 81)  
In confronting dilemmas of ‘prestige’ and ‘reputation’ of local notables, Hunter 
contends that “their visual influence [and virtual recognition] is transformed into 
power” (Hunter 1953, 81). Yet again, the study is diverged towards the economic 
portions of the ruling class, while the local political elite is completely 
overshadowed by the magnitude of the reputation the businessmen possess. The 
emphasis on the predominance and preeminence of the economic elite on local 
decision-making and on its ‘caste’ behavior are furthered in Delbert Miller’s 
inquiry into ‘Pacific City,’ although this time the scholar minds about the political 
decision-makers, as well, mentioning their role as mere ‘counterbalance’ for the 
interests of local big business (Miller 1985, 9-15, esp. 13-15). If C. Wright Mills is 
central for the ‘positional method,’ Warner and Hunter are exemplary for the 
‘reputational method,’ Robert Dahl’s Poliarchy and Who Governs ? (1961) are the 
referential works for the ‘decisional method:’ the research in New Haven 
(Connecticut) revealed that those who hold the political power are essentially 
that quite exclusive group of individuals who take a decision, i.e. who initiates a 
proposition and who subsequently validates or opposes it. Definitely, the scope 
of Dahl’s study is laudable, as his primary intention was to provide a rejoinder to 
both Marxist and elitist interpretations on local politics and to somehow 
‘rehabilitate’ the traditional image and model of the American democracy – even 
at the local level – as veritably democratic and integral, hence refuting Mills’s, 
Warner’s and Hunter’s ‘invitations’ to perceiving national and local elites as 
some sort of complotistic and clandestine caste. Dahl’s elites are factionalist, 
fragmentary, placed in a continuous fight for the control over society (similar to 
the struggle between ‘lions’ and ‘foxes’ in Pareto’s accounts); it is their meeting 
and their subsequent negotiations in the decision-making process that actually 
matters in describing elites. Surely, these factional leaders and groups do agree 
on the very basis of the ‘rules of the democratic game’ and on the accountability 
of the citizens, making ‘poliarchy’ probably the best ‘approximation’ of 
democracy. On the other hand, the observations drawn from the small town of 
New Haven conclude: the central position of the Mayor, who participates to 
decision-making in all spheres of competence; the extreme specialization of the 
                                                                        
2 Actually, Warner’s scale and Hunter’s method of accounting for elite ‘prestige’ lie at the 
fundament of the ‘reputational method.’ 
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elite group; the absence of economic elites in the process of decision-making at 
the local level (with the partial exception of decisions taken in the sphere of 
urban development), etc. Notwithstanding the importance of and the central role 
played by these works in the general scholarly evolution of the local elite studies, 
quite unfortunately, few of them concentrated their attention and interest on the 
composition of the Municipal Council as legislative center of power at the local 
level, particularly within small-to-medium sized communities. The two major 
scholarly pieces that majorly influenced the present study are Samuel 
Eldersveld’s Political Elites in Modern Societies (1989) and Virgil Stoica’s Cine 
conduce Iașul? (2004). The former constitutes a series of three lectures sprung 
out of the empirical inquiries conducted in the late 1970s in Ann Arbor 
(Michigan) among the political activists of the town. The latter is a remarkably 
compelling and extremely close to exhaustiveness study of the local elite in Iași 
(Romania) after 1989; the research is focused on the mayors succeeding in the 
leadership of the city, on the municipality’s functionaries and on the members of 
the Local Council, without actually discriminating among these three clusters.      
For the purpose of this paper, a value is defined as an image of objects, 
events, moods, processes, perceived as right, moral, desirable. A value is 
generally born at the clash between the social reality and the behavioral 
predispositions. In this respect, one distinction appears particularly important: 
the literature differentiates between (a) ‘completely articulated’ values (i.e. those 
of which the individual is fully aware), that are, as a consequence, manipulable, 
and (b) ‘not completely articulated’ values (i.e. those of which the individual is 
more often than not not fully aware), which are, as a result, impossible to 
manipulate, for they appear as trends. As such, the fundamental values embraced 
by the political elites are instrumental for further assessing their attitudes, 
behavior, priorities, preferences. Zeger van der Wal discusses the importance of 
values adopted by the political elites:  
Government elites prioritize and balance public values on a daily basis. How 
and why they do so is largely concealed from us, except for when memoires or 
journalistic uncoverings allow us to listen in on the monologue intérieur of 
statesmen amidst major moral dilemmas. (van der Wal 2014, 1031).  
Clearly, the range of the values embraced can determine corresponding 
behaviors concerning strategy prioritization of the local political elites for their 
constituencies, the nature of their interactions with other groups or institutions, 
the very patterns of recruitment, etc. 
II. Methodological remarks: the case studies, research objectives, 
questions, and methods 
The present research is concerned with the issue of local leadership in the 
countries of East-Central Europe. Concretely, the intended research started as an 
attempt to examine, in a comparative manner, the profile and the role of the local 
Roxana Marin 
100 
political elites in four transitional democracies of East-Central Europe, Romania, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria, and the elites’ impact on the evolution 
of the local communities in the developing region of former Sovietized Europe. 
Basing the case selection on the logic of the most similar design systems, focal 
case studies for the study are four small towns, Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, 
and Targovishte, quite similar in terms of demographics (roughly 40,000 
inhabitants) and developmental strategies (an economy based on the alimentary 
industry and on commerce activities, etc.).3 Hence, the scope of the research was 
initially rather descriptive, exploratory; an inductive, observatory process – an 
inquiry into a range of aspects worth pointing out when dealing with and 
discussing on the study of political elites. Surely, after the gathering of the data 
and confronted with the stark differences among the four towns (in terms of the 
elites’ socio-demographical profile, of value-orientations), the question about the 
factors, the independent variables that might account for both these differences 
and similarities, was inevitably raised. This paper favors two such explanatory 
trajectories, using as independent variables the level of decentralization for each 
case and the ‘legacy of the ancien régime’ (i.e. the communist experience) for 
each of the communities. 
Therefore, the principal research questions of interest here are:  
(1) Which are the main socio-demographical features the local 
political elites of Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte 
display ? 
and  
(2) Which are the values, the perceptions, the orientations, 
embraced by the members of the local political elites in Tecuci, 
Česk| Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte ? Which are their attitudes 
towards key aspects concerning democracy, decentralization and 
autonomy, and cultural-geographical self-identification ?  
For pinpointing the elite groups at the level of the four communities, the 
paper employs the positional method of identifying and analyzing the local 
political elites, by operationalizing the phrase ‘local political elites’ through the 
following definition: The local political elite is that group comprising those 
individuals in legislative and executive positions within the local leading, 
decision-making structure. The resulting population of the empirical research 
was thusly represented by the members of the Local/ Municipal Councils in 
Tecuci (19 persons), Česk| Lípa (25 persons), Oleśnica (22 persons), and 
Targovishte (31 persons) as they were in 2011-2013. The methods of gathering 
                                                                        
3 The manner in which the four towns were chosen corresponds to an initial selection based 
on the demographical and economic criteria, coupled with a convenience selection (i.e. those 
administrations that responded to the researcher’s call).  
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data favored by this paper include: the administration of a standard written 
questionnaire, document analysis on the minutes of the meetings of the four 
Councils, and participatory observation during the sessions of the Councils and 
of their specialized Committees. 
III. Results 
1. The attitudes and orientations of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Targovishte concerning democracy   
The present research evaluates the attitudes of the local political elite towards 
four values referring to the fundaments of the democratic construct and 
quantified by question no. 9 in the administered questionnaire: citizen 
participation; gradual, innovative change; the importance of the political conflict; 
economic equality. The attitudes of the members of the Local Councils towards 
the state intervention in economy were also taken into consideration, while a 
sixth value referred to local autonomy and decentralization, two processes 
permanently on the agenda of the post-communist governments. The attitudes 
towards state intervention in economy and local autonomy and decentralization 
were quantified through attitudinal intensity scale (I strongly agree with – I 
agree with – I partially agree with – I disagree with – I strongly disagree with – 
Don’t know/ don’t answer). 
According to the answers delivered by the local councilors, within a 
democracy, the most valued features are those of citizen participation (with an 
average level of acceptance of 40.8%), and gradual change (an average level of 
acceptance of 22.515%). Economic equality and conflict avoidance pose some 
interesting problems to the value orientations of these elites. Firstly, there is a 
clear rejection of economic equality among the local councilors of Tecuci and 
Targovishte, which can be translated by a syndrome of total detachment, 
expressed rhetorically, from the ancién régime. Secondly, for the local councilors 
of Tecuci, Targovishte, and Oleśnica, conflict avoidance is significant, which 
would hint to a monolithical behavior inside the Council.  
From the analysis of two values – citizen participation and conflict 
avoidance –, it results that the members of the Local Councils in Tecuci, 
Targovishte, and Oleśnica could be characterized as ‘populists’ (accepting citizen 
participation as a mark of democracy, but avoiding political conflict); the 
members of the Municipal Council in Česk| Lípa are largely ‘democrats’ 
(accepting both citizen participation and political conflict as features of 
democracy) (See Table 2).  
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Graphs 1, 2, 3, 4. Values orientation of the municipal councilors in Tecuci, 
Česk| Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte (Q9: “Which of the following 
characteristics do you value the most in a democracy?”) 
 
  
 
 
Table 1. The features of local leadership, according to its attitudes towards 
state intervention in economy and economic equality 
 State intervention in economy  
 Acceptance  Rejection  
Economic 
equality  
Acceptance  Statists-egalitarianists  Anti-statists-egalitarianists  
 Rejection  Statists-anti-
egalitarianists  
Anti-statists-anti-
egalitarianists  
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Table 2. The features of local leadership, according to its attitude towards 
political conflict and citizen participation 
 Political conflict  
 Acceptance  Avoidance  
Citizen 
participation  
Acceptance  Democrats  Populists  
Rejection  Pluralists  Authoritarianists  
 
2. The attitudes and orientations of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Targovishte towards decentralization and state intervention in 
economy 
Measuring the perceptions of the local elite towards larger local autonomy and 
decentralization is instrumental because it provides an insight into the 
acknowledgement of various levels of authority in the leadership of the 
community. The largest palette of attributions belongs to the Municipal Council 
which undertakes the regulation tasks in most of the spheres of the community 
life, including social services, public improvements, education, healthcare, 
cultural and recreation activities. Inversely, there is a side effect to a more 
comprehensive and extended decentralization: larger local autonomy and 
decentralization means primarily an effective say of the municipality on the local 
budget; as a consequence, it lies in the capacity of the local municipality to 
properly collect taxes and to efficiently administer the budgetary revenues 
thusly collected in order to actually effect changes in the various domains of 
competence under its direct supervision. With greater decentralization come 
greater authority and the ability to have a tremendous say in the conduct of the 
community’s affairs, but, conversely, it also comes a great deal of responsibility 
in handling the ever-increasing problems the community confronts with. 
Balancing the advantages with the drawbacks of decentralization and autonomy 
at the local level, the members of the Municipal Council of Oleśnica position 
themselves somewhere in between the enthusiasm of the local elite in Tecuci 
(100% approval of greater decentralization, with a core of 64.7% approving and 
another 11.76% strongly approving decentralization) and in Targovishte 
(93.53% general approval), and the rather cautious pragmatism of the local elite 
in Česk| Lípa (experienced in both the good points and the disadvantages 
decentralization presupposes, with 77.26% approving or partially approving and 
another 22.72% disagreeing with larger local autonomy and decentralization). 
The Polish local political elite displays a sense of realism, properly 
understanding the mechanisms encapsulated by decentralizing a greater range 
of responsibilities in the local authority’s sphere of competence, as 43.75% of the 
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municipal councilors generally agree with decentralization. The acceptance of 
the Polish elites towards decentralization is significantly less than the cases of 
Tecuci (64.70%) and Targovishte (58.06%), but slightly higher than the Czech 
case (40.9%). Relevant, as well, in Oleśnica, the municipal councilors display the 
highest proportion of strong acceptance of decentralization and the perspective 
of autonomous entities in the Polish administrative arrangement: 25% of the 
respondents, as opposed to none in the case of Česk| Lípa, 16.12% for 
Targovishte, and only 11.76% in the case of Tecuci. Decentralization worked its 
charms in Poland, while being partially contested in the Czech Republic and 
unaccomplished and highly problematic in Romania and Bulgaria. In Oleśnica, 
decentralization produced positive effects and a more suitable management at 
the local level; consequently, the attitudes of the local elite towards it mirror 
generally the experience this elite has had with the reality of increased 
devolution and growing array of authority and responsibility.  
The answers provided in the questionnaire by the members of the 
Municipal Councils in Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte, in respect to 
the state intervention in economy and to the prospects of further 
decentralization and local autonomy, sketch: (a) local leaderships in Tecuci and 
Targovishte who are very enthusiastic about decentralization (sometimes, 
without actually being aware of the whole palette of responsibilities that 
increased decentralization generates), but quite undecided to the idea of the 
interventionist state (partly because the political elites coincide with the 
economic elite, and locally, they become easier to act as private entrepreneurs, 
though enjoying the state subsidies); (b) a local leadership in Česk| Lípa who 
presents a real skepticism in respect to an already significantly decentralized 
distribution of power, and generally favorable to the state intervention in 
economy, particularly in times of crisis; (c) a local leadership in Oleśnica who is 
much in favor of both the protectionist state and of increased decentralization 
and local autonomy (with significant proportion of respondents being “strongly 
in favor” of the two); and (d) overall, a local leadership who generally holds a 
positive stance towards increased decentralization and its benefits, and a rather 
cautious stance regarding the state intervention in economy, partly because of 
the government’s attitude in respect to the most recent financial crisis. 
From the analysis of the two value orientations – state intervention in 
economy and economic equality –, it results that: the members of the Local 
Councils in Tecuci and Targovishte could be coined ‘statists-anti-egalitarianists’ 
(largely accepting the state intervention in economy, particularly in times of 
crisis, but rejecting economic equality as a mark of a working democracy); the 
members of the Municipal Councils in Česk| Lípa and Oleśnica could be labeled 
as ‘statists-egalitarianists’ (accepting both the protectionist state and economic 
equality as a feature of democracy, hence the general idea of the ‘welfare 
society’) (See Table 1).  
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Graph 5. The attitudes of the local councilors in respect to the state intervention 
in economy (Q10: “How do you perceive state intervention in economy ?”) 
 
Graph 6. The attitudes of the local councilors in respect to the prospects of 
increased decentralization (Q11: “How do you think about greater local 
autonomy and decentralization, granted by the central authorities?”) 
 
Roxana Marin 
106 
A series of observations are worth pointing out: 
 The local political elites in Tecuci and Targovishte are rather 
statist-anti-egalitarian, which appears rather as a paradox in 
respect to the outlook of the defunct communist regime, a 
‘modernizing-nationalizing’ dictatorship (Petrescu 2010), a 
‘patrimonial’ one (Kitschelt et al. 1999): the image of the state as 
prominent in socio-economical realm is preserved, while a 
rejection of economic equality is strongly affirmed, exactly in 
opposition to the aspirations of the former leadership.  
 In the Czech Republic (as former Czechoslovakia) until 1989, the 
‘theme’ of the regime was the same, but the ‘variation’ was a 
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ (Linz & Stepan 1996), ‘welfare’ 
communist dictatorship. Conversely, in Česk| Lípa, the elites tend 
to be more inclined to a ‘welfare-state’ approach in conducting 
local policies, somehow admitting the social benefits of the former 
regime, without holding a nostalgic stance: this is probably the 
reason why they fit into the category of ‘statist-egalitarians,’ since 
a significant proportion of them are concerned with the social 
problems of the community they represent (especially 
unemployment) and they still cherish economic equality as an 
indispensable value in democracy. 
 The local councilors in Oleśnica display an inclination towards the 
protectionist state, although paradoxically the Polish variant of 
state socialism, ‘national-accommodative’ (Kitschelt et al. 1999) 
communist dictatorship, was the leasts restrictive in socio-
economic and political terms and the most market-oriented one; 
the statist-egalitarian perspective among the political elite in 
Oleśnica is to denote a reminder of the more permissive type of 
communist regime Poland experienced.  
 All in all, it is notorious that the four countries whose local elites 
are here under scrutiny suffered a regime change in their recent 
history, which marked a somewhat consistent process of ‘elite 
circulation,’ for the Czech and the Polish cases, and a persistent 
‘elite reproduction,’ for the Romanian and the Bulgarian cases.  
3. The geographical identification of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Targovishte (the local political elites’ degree of isolation) 
The geographical identification of the local political elite was considered in order 
to correlate it with the level of localism and isolation of the ruling groups of 
small-to-medium communities. Stronger links and power networks formed and 
maintained at the local level suggest localism and, subsequently, a more 
pronounced focus on the local priorities and, conversely, an isolation with 
respect to the national concerns. Similarly, it might be hypothesized that a 
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geographical identification inclined towards localism (i.e. the cases in which the 
local councilors identify primarily with their native municipalities, with the town 
they presently represent or with the region which they inhabit) is prone to 
generate an emphasis on local problems, perceived as taking precedence over 
the ‘national interests.’ Considering these observations, the Municipal Council in 
Oleśnica expectedly exposes a high degree of localism, as 50% of the members of 
the Council identify first and foremost with the municipality they politically 
represent and govern, the town of Oleśnica; another 15% of the councilors bear 
a particular attachment towards the native town/ village, thus making localism 
in geographical identification a characteristic pertaining to 65% of the Council. 
Part of the discrepancies among the four cases in respect to the cultural-
geographical identification springs from the very administrative arrangements 
of each country under scrutiny. But the differences lie also in the degree of 
openness each elite group inquired here actually displays. Indeed, the high level 
of localism is dominant for all cases, though quite dissimilar as numerical value: 
65% in Oleśnica, 72.72% in Tecuci, 86.1% in Targovishte, 92.29% in Česk| Lípa; 
it results that, as a matter of fact, the local elite in Oleśnica is the least isolated, 
which would, to a certain extent, stand against the isolation of the same group 
when considering their overwhelmingly local connections and networks of 
power. All in all, the average level of localism among the three cases is 76.67%, 
that of regionalism mounts to 11.87% of the entire population comprised in the 
four Municipal Councils, while that of nationalism is 11.06%.  
 
Graphs 7, 8, 9, 10. Q13: Which of the cultural and territorial entitites do you 
identify yourself with firstly? 
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4. The ideal portrait of the local/ municipal councilor (quality-based profile) 
Procedural openness and transparency are not necessarily functional. Of 
course, outcomes need to be clear as well as division of responsibilities and 
accountability, but a certain degree of secrecy is not an absolute necessity. At 
the moment, I am involved in a major governance process: I cannot tell you 
what kind of process because it is highly secretive. And please, no transparency 
at this stage because it will inevitably lead to immediate failure! It is also a 
matter of (...), secrecy – or perhaps exclusiveness of information is a better term 
– is not such a big issue as such as long as you do not lie to people. And even 
that is not really a crime as long as you’re acting in the public interest, right? 
(van der Wal 2014, 1030, citing a British elected official) 
Apart from the value-based profile of the local political elites in the four 
towns selected (constructed here on the general attitudes of the local leadership 
towards values of democracy, the state intervention in economy, the furthering 
of decentralization process, and the cultural-geographical self-identification), the 
value attainment and orientations could be equally scrutinized with the 
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assistance of the projections the local/ municipal councilors build about their 
public posture. Hence, the quality-based profile, regarding the (self-constructed) 
ideal portrait of the local/ municipal councilor, was formed after the gathering of 
the responses of the members of the four Municipal Councils to the question: 
“What are the first five most important qualities a municipal councilor should 
possess ?” The answers received have been collected under five clusters of 
qualities – referred here as ‘models’ –, founded on Prewitt’s fivefold quality 
model of political elites (1970). The quality-based profile is instrumental for 
both the value attainment of the elite and for such distant matters, such as the 
patterns of recruitment, degree of interaction with other groups and institutions, 
level of isolation towards the constituency or in respect to the central elite, the 
degree of accountability, responsiveness and the mechanisms of strategy 
prioritization, etc. As a consequence, after the collection of the answers, the 
following distribution was formed:    
 The ethical model (22.65%, for Tecuci; 28.68%, for Česk| 
Lípa; 18.91%, for Oleśnica; 32.23%, for Targovishte); 
 The political model (23.98%; 12.93%; 4.05%; 32.23%); 
 The technocratic model (9.33%; 21.28%; 18.90%; 10.52%); 
 The pragmatic model (21.32%; 37%; 45.9%; 25%); 
 The gender model (0% for all cases).  
For identifying the qualities that ideally a local councilor should possess, 
qualities that could constitute eligibility criteria for both the parties and the 
electorate and that could represent the degree of value attainment and would 
provide a hint as to the value orientations of the local leadership under scrutiny, 
the questionnaire included an open question addressing the issue. After 
comprehensively scrutinizing the ones in power, the recent scholarly generally 
agreed on five models (Prewitt 1970) that might account for specific ‘qualities’ in 
defining and identifying elites. The assemblage of these models pledges to the 
fact that a normative-descriptive reconciliation was intended, although in an 
overwhelmingly descriptive fashion.4 The ‘ethical model’ of political elite refers 
to such qualities as: correctness, honesty, fairness, altruism, modesty, high moral 
standards, verticality and seriousness, courage and bravery, punctuality. The 
‘technocratic model’ of political elite takes into consideration such attributes as: 
political experience, political will, expertise and training, intelligence, patience/ 
rapid reaction, enthusiasm and imagination. The ‘pragmatic model’ of political 
elite is respective to such features as: dedication to the constituency’s (state’s) 
                                                                        
4 This is particularly the reason why this paper coins the recent (i.e. post-Wright-Mills) 
empirical drive in studying and defining political elites as ‘neo-descriptive’), since it admits the 
necessity of introducing the ‘ethical model,’ in spite of the fact that the inquiries are in 
themselves largely descriptive, exploratory.  
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improvement plans, devotion and respect for the community/ country, desire to 
change, the capacity to identify development opportunities for the community/ 
country, vision, perspective, initiative, persuasion skills, capacity to compromise 
and negotiate, dialog-oriented, intuition, social sensitivity, care for the citizen, 
economic independence, leadership skills. The ‘political model’ subscribes to the 
following qualities: oratorical skills, rhetoric, political loyalty, incorruptibility, 
interest detachment (objectivity), collegiality and team spirit. The ‘gender model’ 
refers to the gender quality The results largely coincide to an ethical model, with 
features such as honesty (justness, correctness, fairness) (14.66% of the answers 
for Tecuci, 12.03% of the answers for Česk| Lípa, 12.16% of the responses for 
Oleśnica, and 13.81% of the responses for Targovishte), moral verticality (5.33% 
for Tecuci, 2.7% for Oleśnica, and some impressive and telling 10.18% for Česk| 
Lípa and 10.52% for Targovishte), altruism (1.33% of the answers for Tecuci, 
4.05% for Oleśnica, 3.28% for Targovishte) and modesty (1.33% of the 
responses for Tecuci, 1.85% of the responses for Česk| Lípa, 3,94% for 
Targovishte), courage (3.7% for Česk| Lípa, and 0.65% for Targovishte) among 
the most important qualities a local councilor should have. The technocratic 
model is equally valued by the local councilors: a significant number pointed out 
such characteristics as training and expertise (4% of the answers for Tecuci, 
4.62% for Česk| Lípa, 2.7% for Oleśnica, and 2.63% for Targovishte) and 
political experience (5.33% for Tecuci, 6.48% for Česk| Lípa, 4.6% for 
Targovishte), effectiveness (2.7% for Oleśnica, and 1.97% for Targovishte), 
intelligence (6.48% of the answers for Česk| Lípa, 4.05% for Oleśnica, and 1.31% 
for Targovishte) as the hallmark of the technocratic model. Those local 
councilors mentioning the dedication to the town’s improvement plans, desire to 
change and respect for the community (12% for Tecuci, 10.52% for Targovishte, 
a falling 8.33% for Česk| Lípa, 0% for Oleśnica), the capacity to identify 
development opportunities for the town (1.35% for Oleśnica, 6.66% for Tecuci, 
7.23% for Targovishte, 10.18% for Česk| Lípa), the initiative (1.33% for Tecuci 
and some similar 1.85% for Česk| Lípa and 1.97% for Targovishte), the 
persuasion skills, the capacity to compromise and negotiated, dialogue-
orientation (1.31% for Targovishte, 1.33% for Tecuci and, more significantly, 
7.4% for Česk| Lípa and 8.1% for Oleśnica), social sensitivity and care for the 
citizen (3.7% for  Česk| Lípa, and 9.45% for Oleśnica), etc. favored the pragmatic 
model. Finally, the political model was constructed through the following 
qualities: party loyalty (7.23% of the responses for Targovishte, 2.66% of the 
answers for Tecuci and 1.85% of the answers for Česk| Lípa), oratorical skills 
(1.97% for Targovishte, 1.33% for Tecuci, and 0.92% for Česk| Lípa), 
incorruptibility and interest detachment (8% for Tecuci, and some similar 7.39% 
for Česk| Lípa and 6.56% for Targovishte, only 2.7% for Oleśnica), but, most 
importantly, team spirit and collegiality (16.44% of the answers in the case of 
Targovishte, 12% of the responses in the case of Tecuci, as opposed to 2.77% of 
the responses in the case of Česk| Lípa). The gender model was not used by the 
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present study, as no local councilor perceived the gender differences as being 
important in sketching the ideal profile of a member of the Local Council. Quite 
importantly, the case of the members of the Municipal Council in Oleśnica (and, 
most probably, in Poland) appears as an outliner for the ‘political model,’ for this 
set of qualities is profoundly overlooked by the local leadership here. This 
rejection of the necessity of the ‘political’ qualities for a municipal councilor is 
explainable by the patterns of recruitment in Poland, where the municipal 
councilors are elected through extramural procedures and, thusly, they do not 
need the backing of a political party to get elected; generally, these persons bear 
and preserve strong ties with the civil society organizations, with the civic and 
reform groups, with the neighbourhood groups (including friends and 
supporters), and the support of a political party becomes, in this context, futile. 
Consequently, such virtues as political loyalty (0%), collegiality and team spirit 
(0%), oratorical skills (0%) are surpassed by political independence (1.35%), 
incorruptibility (1.35%) and interest detachment (1.35%). Overall, the political 
model is compatible with 4.05% of the responses in Oleśnica, three times lower 
that the next lowest value on the ‘political model’ (that of Česk| Lípa) and eight 
times lower than the highest value on the ‘political model’ (the case of 
Targovishte). Nevertheless, the case of the local leadership of Oleśnica remains 
typical for the ‘ethical model,’ robustly present in the sketch of each of the four 
groups.   
It is significant to mention that the distribution of the qualities along the 
five models in each of the four cases is determined largely of various endogenous 
and exogenous factors, including, but not limited to: the socio-demographical 
background of the respondents, the patterns of recruitment according to which 
they are (s)elected, the interactions and contacts they establish and entertain, 
the degree of political-administrative decentralization, the ‘legacy of the former 
regime’ and its nature, etc.    
IV. Tentative explanations 
The present study advances a threefold classification of local political leadership, 
constructed employing mainly two explanatory trajectories, one of them being 
discussed at some length here: (a) the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization specific for each of the countries under scrutiny, and (2) the 
‘legacy’ of the former communist regime, expressed through the type of ‘elite 
political culture’ (Jowitt 1999). For the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization, although the paper acknowledges the importance of various 
other forms of decentralization (vertical, decision-making, appointment, 
electoral, fiscal, personnel – Treisman 2002; administrative v. political; 
territorial v. technical – Apostol Tofan 2008; vertical v. horizontal; functional v. 
territorial – Stoica 2003; internal v. external), it favors a rather reductionist 
approach on fiscal, expenditure-based decentralization. For this purpose, it 
employs the average indexes of decentralization currently utilized by the World  
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Table no. 3. The features of the local leadership, according to the quality-based 
profile constructed by the local political elites themselves (Q16: “What are the 
first five most important qualities a municipal councilor should possess ?”) 
 
Tecuci Česká Lípa Oleśnica Targovishte 
Ethical model 
    
Correctness, honesty, fairness, truthfulness 14.66% 12.03% 12.16% 13.81% 
Altruism, selflessness 1.33% 
 
4.05% 3.28% 
Modesty 1.33% 1.85% 
 
3.94% 
High moral standards, verticality and seriousness, 
sobriety, personal discipline 
5.33% 10.18% 2.7% 10.52% 
Courage, bravery 
 
3.7% 
 
0.65% 
Punctuality 
 
0.92% 
  
Technocratic model 
    
Political experience, political will 5.33% 6.48% 
 
4.60% 
Expertise and training 4% 4.62% 2.7% 2.63% 
Reliability 
  
5.4% 
 
Effectiveness, competence 
  
2.7% 1.97% 
Intelligence, wisdom 
 
6.48% 4.05% 1.31% 
Patience or rapid reaction 
 
1.85% 
  
Enthusiasm, imagination, creativity, innovation 
 
1.85% 4.05% 
 
Pragmatic model 
    
Dedication to the town’s improvement plans, 
devotion, respect for the community, desire to 
change 
12% 8.33% 
 
10.52% 
Involvement, diligence, commitment, assertiveness, 
industry   
9.45% 
 
Determent, consistency, consequence 
  
4.05% 
 
Thoroughness 
  
1.35% 
 
The capacity to identify development opportunities 
for the town (vision, perspective) 
6.66% 10.18% 1.35% 7.23% 
Initiative 1.33% 1.85% 
 
1.97% 
Persuasion skills, capacity to compromise, 
cooperate and negotiate, dialog-oriented, non-
conflict 
1.33% 7.4% 8.1% 1.31% 
Intuition 
 
0.92% 
  
Openness with others, tolerance, broadmindedness 
  
9.45% 
 
Social sensitivity, social activity, care for the citizen 
 
3.7% 9.45% 
 
Economic independence 
 
1.85% 
 
1.31% 
Leadership skills 
 
2.77% 
 
2.63% 
Accountability, responsiveness 
  
2.7% 
 
Political model 
    
Oratorical skills 1.33% 0.92% 
 
1.97% 
Political loyalty 2.66% 1.85% 
 
7.23% 
Incorruptibility 5.33% 4.62% 1.35% 3.28% 
Interest detachment (objectivity) 2.66% 2.77% 1.35% 3.28% 
Collegiality, team spirit 12% 2.77% 
 
16.44% 
Political independence 
  
1.35% 
 
Gender model 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Bank and the IMF in the issuing of their annual reports,5 operationalizing 
‘decentralization’ as the subnational share of general government expenditure. 
In order to properly account for the differences in the level of fiscal-
administrative decentralization among the four cases, this paper adds to these 
indexes three thresholds, thusly: (a) a significant level of administrative and 
fiscal decentralization describes the countries whose average subnational share 
of general expenditure is higher than 50%; (b) a standard level of 
decentralization is specific for those countries with an average local and regional 
share of general government expenditure higher than 30%, but lower than 50%; 
and (c) a low level of decentralization characterizes the countries with a 
subnational share of general government expenditure lower than 30%. 
 
Table no. 4. The proportion of subnational share of general government 
expenditure (expressed as percentage from the total national budget) 
 
Public 
order & 
Safety 
Education Health Social 
Security & 
Welfare 
Housing & 
Communal 
Amenities 
Recreation & 
Culture 
Transportation & 
Communication 
Average 
BULGARIA 2.17 59.53 44.11 8.30 68.95 26.69 12.19 31.70% 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
17.20 17.22 5.98 8.03 68.47 61.89 46.53 32.18% 
BULGARIA 6.86 46.99 44.83 11.99 74.10 43.97 27.64 36.62% 
POLAND 34.30 72.47 87.36 17.49 86.92 76.13 65.34 62.85% 
ROMANIA 4.80 9.23 0.36 2.97 83.01 34.74 17.55 21.80% 
SLOVAKIA 5.69 2.40 0.26 0.49 56.74 27.00 18.78 15.90% 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 
IMF, Washington, D.C., 2001. The data is selected only for the countries of East-
Central Europe, former satellites of USSR.) 
                                                                        
5 Along a series of domains of considerable interest at the local level (infrastructure, 
education, healthcare, public security, transportation, social services (including housing and 
unemployment relief), cultural and recreational activities, etc.), it evaluates the extent to 
which they are dealt with nationally, regionally and locally. This evaluation is constructed 
primarily based on pieces of legislation, bylaws, internal regulations of different 
administrative and executive bodies, as well as on some empirical endeavors undertaken by 
the World Bank and the IMF expertise. 
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Conclusively, (a) for the significant level of fiscal-administrative 
decentralization, the Polish case is exponential; (b) the standard level of 
decentralization fits the Czech and the Bulgarian cases, whereas (c) the low level 
of decentralization is specific to the Romanian case. Recent studies have shown 
the impact of decentralization formulae on the outlook and the role of local 
political elites. Such an empirical concern has been focused primarily on Latin 
America, South Asia (Beard, Miraftab, & Silver 2008; Smoke, Gómez, & Peterson 
2006; Burki, Perry, & Dillinger 1999; Escobar-Lemmon 2003; Bardhan 2002; 
Garman, Haggard, & Willis 2001; Falleti 2005 etc.), and Africa (Cottingham 
1970), while the topic has been generally neglected for the developing 
democracies of East-Central Europe. Dora Orlansky (2000, 196) discusses the 
impact of decentralization upon the power-sharing between the central and the 
local administrative layers and upon the extent of political power and 
responsibility local elites are expected to exert. Discussing a series of examples 
from Africa and South Asia, Devarajan et al. (2009, 118-119) refer to the dangers 
of elite isolation with the increase in decentralized communities and to shifts in 
delivery of public services once with the process of decentralization. Quite 
interestingly, Merilee S. Grindle (2007, 63-105) introduces the example of 
decentralization in Mexico, concluding that proper fiscal and administrative 
decentralization can result in high levels of political competition and satisfaction 
with the living in the town, both at the level of the local elites and the 
community. It becomes apparent that local leadership modifies its outlook and 
prioritization strategy in the context of change of administrative organization 
leading to increased decentralization. Jonathan Rodden (2004) presents the 
impact of different forms of decentralization upon the city management, but, 
most importantly, upon the degree of elite isolation and passive representation. 
Finally, opposing two main approaches in reference to the impact of 
decentralization policies – the ‘liberal-individualist’ and ‘statist’ approaches –, 
Aylin Topal (2012) describes forms of elite isolation after the proper 
implementation of decentralization policies and differences of agenda setting of 
local elites as response to increased decentralization. The fashion in which the 
elites’ outlook, value orientation and strategy prioritization actually modifies is 
partially elaborated in the present paper, with a special focus on particular 
municipalities in four countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria.    
The levels of decentralization may impact the drafting of policy agenda at 
the local level, the strategy prioritization, the degree of elite isolation (i.e. the 
insistence on contacts and interactions confined to the governed municipality), 
some of the value-orientations, etc. Hence, it is expected that a significant level of 
decentralization would exhibit an equally high degree of elite isolation and 
would induce an orientation towards the so-called ‘hard’ spheres of activities 
(e.g. public improvements, infrastructure, economic development, public order, 
etc.), a considerable degree of political responsibility and responsiveness, and 
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the identification with a rather ‘pragmatic’ and ‘technocratic’ elite profile. On the 
other hand, it might be easily hypothesized that low levels of decentralization 
can only result in a geographically open elite, in a focus on rather ‘soft’ spheres of 
activity and a policy prioritization accordingly (e.g. education, healthcare, 
culture, youth and recreation activities, etc.), due to a perceived impotence of 
implementing change locally and a resulting low level of political responsibility, 
and the construction of an elite profile concentrated on ‘ethical’ and ‘political’ 
models. The second explanatory trajectory refers to the legacy of the ancien 
régime. In order to operationalize this complex variable, this study utilizes the 
differentiation operated by Kitschelt et al. (1999) between three types of 
communist dictatorship in the countries of former Sovietized Europe: (1) 
‘national accommodative’ communist dictatorship (e.g. Poland and Hungary), (2) 
‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ or ‘welfare’ communist dictatorship (Jarausch 1999) 
(e.g. Czechoslovakia and East Germany), and (3) ‘patrimonial’ or ‘modernizing-
nationalizing’ communist dictatorship (Petrescu 2010) (e.g. Romania and 
Bulgaria). 
Depending on the type of communist dictatorship faced by each of the four 
societies under scrutiny here, the elite developed a certain form of ‘political 
culture,’6 remnant features of which have been traduced, reproduced or 
preserved outright during the transition and the period of democratic 
consolidation. The study favors Jowitt’s collocation ‘elite political culture’7 (1992, 
                                                                        
6 The definition and operationalization of ‘political culture’ have resulted into an 
overwhelming diversity in understanding. Even though, almost all the studies tackling the 
topic of ‘political culture’ revolve around the spiritus rectores G. Almond and S. Verba and their 
pioneering opus magnum The Civic Culture, for the specific study of political elites, R. Putnam 
famously referred to ‘elite political culture,’ defined as some form of attitudinal and behavioral 
aggregates of the elite group, generally constant, hardly changeable, stable ones; the term 
accounts for “patterns of beliefs and attitudes [prevalent among the members of the political 
elite] about the economic, political, social, cultural systems” (Putnam 1973). In applying the 
observations drawn from the usage of the concept ‘elite political culture,’ one could only 
wonder if the four selected groups forming the Municipal Councils of the municipalities of 
Tecuci, Česk| Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte have acquired a sense of group consciousness as 
an elite; such an ‘elite consciousness’ at the local level is difficult to be operationalized and 
subsequently measured, but some attemptive endeavors might employ such indicators as the 
degree of group cohesion, the acknowledgement of some ‘special’ (i.e. specific) traits a local 
councilor should possess (excepting, of course, the moral, ethical dimension which is by no 
means one of group or status differentiation in the case of elites). Actually, though rhetorically 
catchy and discursively fashionable, the ethical image of the political elite, in the sweet 
Aristotelian tradition, is an obsolete one, and its obsoleteness became conspicuous in the 
literature as early as the beginning of the 20th century, with the famous works of the Italian 
‘elitists,’ the trio Pareto – Mosca – Michels.  
7 ‘Elite political culture’ is “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures 
that emerge as response to and consequence of a given elite’s identity-forming experiences.” 
Ken Jowitt (1992) defines ‘elite political culture’ somehow in opposition to what he coins as 
‘regime political culture’ (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) 
postures that emerge in response to the institutional definition of social, economic, and 
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51-52, and 54-56) to refer to those attitudinal and behavioral traits inherited 
from the ancien régime, conserved from the central to the local level. For 
instance, a former ‘patrimonial’ regime would result in an increased monolithism 
of the new political elites, whereas a ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ would produce 
a political elite who is technocratically-oriented. Finally, a ‘national-
accommodative’ former regime is prone to generate in contemporaneity an elite 
who is rather fragmented, factionalist, allowing for opposition, contestation and 
certain degree of ‘back-bencherism,’ along with a pragmatic attitude in decision-
making and profile identification. Moreover, a series of socio-demographical 
indicators in the elite profile construction are tempered by the nature of the 
former regime, as is the case, for instance, with the rate of ascendant social 
mobility, which is generally higher in previously ‘patrimonial’ communist 
regimes, while decreasing in the case of formerly ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ 
communist dictatorship, where there had existed a small group of ‘petite 
bourgeoisie,’ rather an a large mass of peasants out of which democracy later 
selected its elites.   
One of the most immediate elements inherited from the defunct regime in 
the Romanian and the Bulgarian cases and so facilely transmitted at the local 
level, where it found a fertile soil to further develop and be perpetuated: the 
insistence and perseverance of the political elite to aspirate the leadership 
positions in other societal spheres as well, especially the economic and social 
ones, less the cultural facets of the community. Not only does the local political 
elite in Tecuci bear the monopoly on economic activities, but it also leads the 
social life of the town, through its position on the hierarchical scheme of the 
community (leading physicians, directors of schools, chiefs of administrative 
committees, administrators of public spots, etc.). 
Transiting the Councils from Tecuci, Targovishte, Česk| Lípa to Oleśnica 
and back, one can observe two monolithic-like elites, highly homogeneous in 
terms of bio-demographical features, values, priorities and patterns of 
recruitment, cherishing party loyalty, political experience and collegiality (team 
spirit) especially, opposing a more heterogeneous elite group, demographically 
more diverse, with different values and cultural standards, with an in-between 
case (Oleśnica), where a monolithic type of elite in terms of education, family 
background and occupational status is pondered and counterbalanced by a 
constant concern with the problems of the immediate constituency and by 
meaningful involvement in civic and reform groups. 
                                                                                                                                                       
political life”) and ‘community political culture’ (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral 
and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to the historical relationships between 
regime and community”. For Jowitt, as opposed to any other scholar of ‘political culture,’ the 
said collocation is actually defined in terms of behavioral analysis of the ancien régime: the 
‘political culture’ is “the set of informal, adaptative postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that 
emerge in response to, and interact with, the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy and 
institutional – that characterize a given level of society.” 
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Monolithism and the predominance of a ‘political model’ might be 
reminiscent of the elites of the former regime, while a ‘pragmatic model’ and a 
fragmented elite group would coincide to a tradition of circulating elites and 
technocratic ‘petite bourgeoisie’ during the period of state socialism. Instead, 
nowadays, it is the ‘pragmatic model’ of ‘organizational and personal 
commitments,’ of efficiency and effective management, that surpasses the 
importance of the ‘political model’ of party and ideological loyalty: though the 
influence of party affiliations and ideological affinities become crucial and even 
indispensable, they lose their importance in the face of the localized problems 
the small community confronts with; problem-solving, respect for the 
community, competence and the capacity to pinpoint development opportunities 
for the town are those features that take precedence when a group establishes 
itself as a local political elite. Together, all assets listed render the local councilor 
for political leadership more commendable than his peers who may lack them. 
With these differences in mind, if one is to conclude if a certain form of 
‘democratic elitism’ and an ‘elite consciousness’ are at work in the four cases 
discussed, inductive reasoning seems to have fallen down to a certain extent. 
Indeed, one may reason that, largely, the members of the four Municipal Councils 
bear the incipient features of perceiving themselves as a quite distinct group of 
notables within their respective communities. However, the ‘elitist exercise’ is 
far from being a constant in the leadership outlook of the four small 
communities, the local elites displaying a rather ‘popular’ image of the leading 
ones.  
V. Concluding remarks and a tentative taxonomy 
If we know how the participants [to the political game] got there, where they 
came from, by what pathways, what ideas, skills and contacts they acquired or 
discarded along the way, then we will have a better understanding of political 
events.[…] [K]nowing their abilities, sensitivities, aims and credentials, we are 
better able to anticipate what they say and do, and to evaluate elites, 
institutions and systems performance. (Marvick 1968, 273-282) 
The present study advances a threefold classification of local political leadership, 
constructed employing mainly two explanatory trajectories, one of the being 
discussed at some length here: (a) the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization specific for each of the countries under scrutiny, and (2) the 
‘legacy’ of the former communist regime, expressed through the type of ‘elite 
political culture’ (Jowitt 1999). Thusly, the study proposes and favors the 
differentiation among three types of elites, underpinned on the specific content 
of elite political culture and on the set of attributions provided by a certain 
degree of decentralization: 
 ‘Predominantly elitistic’ (e.g. Tecuci and Targovishte), 
corresponding to a former ‘modernizing-nationalizing,’ ‘patrimonial’ 
communist dictatorship, followed by ‘elite reproduction,’ and low 
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levels of administrative decentralization and local autonomy, 
presently; characterized by a significant degree of ‘elite 
distinctiveness;’ 
 ‘Democratic elitist’ (e.g. Česk| Lípa), corresponding to a defunct 
‘national-accommodative’ communist dictatorship, followed by ‘elite 
circulation,’ and high levels of decentralization and local autonomy, in 
the present; 
 ‘Predominantly democratic’ (e.g. Oleśnica), corresponding to a 
former ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian,’ ‘welfare’ communist dictatorship, 
followed by ‘elite circulation,’ a tradition of administrative 
decentralization, and significant levels of local autonomy, nowadays.  
‘Predominantly elitistic’ are those elites characterized by a significant 
degree of ‘elite distinctiveness,’ i.e. perceiving themselves, as a group or 
individually, as separate from the bulk of the town’s population, as part of a 
special, superior caste of notables and local potentates, hence prone to favor the 
clear gap between the rulers and the ruled; enjoying considerable levels of 
prestige and reputation, this type of local elites display however a sense of 
reluctance in effectively dealing with the community’s main problems, on the 
basis that power at the local level is insufficient to allow the leadership here to 
implement change. Therefore, it might be concluded that the ‘predominately 
elitist’ local leadership corresponds to those communities presenting low 
degrees of decentralization and local autonomy. Additionally, the ‘predominantly 
elitistic’ local elites are tightly linked to a ‘political’ model, for their recruitment 
is almost exclusively intramural, all those comprising the local leadership being 
party members and benefiting from the otherwise indispensable support of the 
party, whose local branches are highly dependent of the central one. 
Interestingly, the ‘predominantly elitistic’ groups are those that most closely 
approximate the Aristotelian desideratum in their construction, conception and 
self-perception: they tend to adhere to an ‘ethical’ model of the ideal local 
councilor, at least declaratively cherishing moral attributes that would provide 
them with some sort of moral superiority as prime marks of distinctiveness in 
respect to their constituency, to the population of their community.      
‘Democratic elitist’ are those elites whose traits and profiles point to some 
form of aurea mediocritas between a sense of distinctiveness and the prestige 
they enjoy within the community, on the one hand, and the effective and 
meaningful dedication to their community’s developmental plans, on the other 
hand; as such, though they form a ‘caste’ of notables within the town and are 
hardly representative to the population of the establishments they lead, in socio-
demographical terms, they can act decisively for the benefit of their town due to 
a considerable degree of local autonomy and decentralized prerogatives, 
responsibilities and attributions. The local councilors of the ‘democratic elitist’ 
sort remain still largely dependent on the support of the political parties, but the 
local parties appear independent in respect to their central branch; occasionally, 
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‘democratic elitist’ type corresponds to intramural recruitment of locally-
established parties, splinters or other quite localized political movements and 
organizations, responding to extremely specific needs and demands or 
describing relatively strong political localism and allowing for factionalism and 
decentralized, territorialized ‘back-bencher’-ism. In addition, the ‘democratic 
elitist’ groups overlap on a rather ‘pragmatic’ or ‘technocratic’ model of the local 
councilor, as the most cherished attributes of the leadership come to be the 
professionalism of the local leadership, its capacity in decision-making, policy 
designing and problem-solving. 
‘Predominantly democratic’ are those elites featuring a sense of 
identification with the masses, with the ordinary citizens of the community they 
happen to represent temporarily, a dominating ‘social sensitivity’ that would 
determine their propensity towards social security and welfare strategies in 
local leadership; this type of local elites are juxtaposed to a tradition of 
decentralization and devolution mechanisms that permit them to identify and to 
implement policies responding to the needs of the town. The ‘predominantly 
democratic’ type of local elites is probably the closest to the population it 
represents in terms of passive representation, for it may include persons of 
lower education, or people previously involved in directly advocating for the 
interests of some segments in the community (pupils, women, unemployed, 
workers, etc.). These local leaders are usually quite familiar with the problems 
their town confronts with, being especially concerned with social issues (e.g. 
unemployment, social benefits, housing, etc.). The methods of recruiting elites in 
this context are highly inclusive, but the actual specificity of these elites is the 
extramural fashion in which they are selected, as their political affiliation is futile 
if existent; the role of the party in the recruitment process, either local or central 
branches, is virtually insignificant. Consequently, the ‘predominantly democratic’ 
local elites correspond to rather ‘pragmatic’ and ‘moral’ profiles, while the 
‘political’ model is virtually absent in their case. 
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